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Abstract—Many real-world cyber-physical systems (CPS) use
proprietary cipher algorithms. In this work, we describe an
easy-to-use black-box security evaluation approach to measure
the strength of proprietary ciphers without having to know the
algorithms. We quantify the strength of a cipher by measuring
how difficult it is for a neural network to mimic the cipher
algorithm. We define new metrics (e.g., cipher match rate,
training data complexity and training time complexity) that are
computed from neural networks to quantitatively represent the
cipher strength. This measurement approach allows us to directly
compare the security of ciphers. Our experimental demonstration
utilizes fully connected neural networks with multiple parallel
binary classifiers at the output layer. The results show that
when compared with round-reduced DES, the security strength
of Hitag2 (a popular stream cipher used in the keyless entry of
modern cars) is weaker than 3-round DES.
Index Terms—black-box evaluation, cryptanalysis, neural net-
works, CPS ciphers
I. INTRODUCTION
For many real-world cyber-physical systems (e.g. keyless
entry of modern vehicles in Figure 1), it is common to use
lightweight symmetric ciphers. However, unlike the asymmet-
ric ciphers whose security can be reduced to the hardness of
mathematical problems, the security of symmetric ciphers is
required to be evaluated empirically. Cryptanalysis (e.g., [1]–
[4]) refers to the line of work that systematically measures the
strength of ciphers. Cryptanalysis of symmetric ciphers works
by launching various attacks and assessing whether or not a
cryptographic primitive is resistant to these attacks.
In traditional symmetric cryptanalysis, an attack is regarded
as successful if the key can be recovered with a complexity
less than the brute-force key search. There are several ex-
isting attack approaches (e.g., linear cryptoanalysis [2] and
differential cryptoanalysis [5]). A cryptanalyst has to launch
them one by one to evaluate a cipher. The security level of the
cipher is determined by the best-effort attack. For conventional
cryptanalysis, human intervention and manual effort play a
central role – an intrinsic limitation. Because a feasible attack
is enabled by certain unbalanced mathematical relationships
(e.g. linear approximation bias, high-probability differential
path). These unbalanced mathematical relationships need to
be manually identified. Due to the huge search space, one
cannot automatically exhaust all possible paths to identify
high probabilistic ones. Thus, conventional cryptanalysis has
limited scalability.
Besides, traditional cryptanalysis methods also require
knowledge of the cipher algorithm. Ciphers on commercial
cyber-physical systems (CPS) are usually proprietary, e.g.,
Hitag2, Megamos Crypto [6]. Traditional cryptanalysis ap-
proaches cannot be directly applied. Fully recovering the
cipher algorithm through reverse engineering may not always
be possible.
In this paper, we address the problem of black-box and
scalable cryptanalysis for symmetric ciphers, specifically how
to automatically measure the cipher strengths without the
knowledge of cipher algorithms. This problem has not been
addressed in the cryptanalysis literature. We define neural
cryptanalysis as a cryptanalysis approach that leverages the
learning ability of neural networks to measure the strengths of
ciphers.
We train neural networks to mimic cipher algorithms. The
stronger the cipher is, the more difficult it is for this cipher
to be mimicked. The training data is a collection of plaintext-
ciphertext pairs. The task is to predict ciphertexts on the input
of plaintexts. This task is equivalent to its opposite version,
predicting plaintexts from ciphertexts due to the symmetry
of encryption and decryption. The mimicking success breaks
the cipher by uncovering the mapping between plaintexts and
ciphertexts. We represent the mimic difficulty by prediction
accuracy and corresponding required training data and time.
Traditional cryptanalysis regards key extraction as the suc-
cess of the attack while neural cryptanalysis aims to predict
ciphertexts without knowing the key. Traditional cryptanalysis
performs delicate manual mathematical analysis to calculate
the influence of the key value to plaintext-ciphertext statistics.
Our approach is automatic and scalable. We further compare
them in Table I.
The closest related work on neural cryptanalysis is done by
Alani [9], [10]. The author claims to be able to successfully
predict plaintexts from ciphertexts of DES and 3-DES by
learning from around 211 and 212 plaintext-ciphertext pairs,
respectively. The work adopts a cascade neural network archi-
tecture. 1 However, our experimental findings suggest that the
claims in [9], [10] on full-round DES and 3DES cannot be
reproduced (further discussed in Section IV-A).
1Alani [9], [10] reported the average training time of 51 minutes and
72 minutes using MATLAB on a single computer for DES and 3-DES,
respectively.
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Approaches Required Data Required Knowledge Attack Goal
Attack Success
Condition
Attack Enabler
Cryptanalysis
Plaintext-ciphertext
Pairs
Cipher Algorithm Key Recovery
Attack Complexity
< Exhausitive Key
Search Complexity
Unbalanced
Statistical
Property
Learning-aided
Cryptanalysis (e.g. [7], [8])
Plaintext-ciphertext
Pairs
Cipher Algorithm Key Recovery
Attack Complexity
< Exhausitive Key
Search Complexity
Unbalanced
Statistical
Property
Neural Cryptanalysis
Plaintext-ciphertext
Pairs
No Further Knowledge Ciphertext Prediction
Cipher Match Rate
> Base Match Rate
Predictability by
Neural Network
TABLE I: Comparison between differential cryptanalysis and neural-cryptanalysis.
Our neural cryptanalysis approach should not be confused
with learning-aided cryptanalysis that applies neural networks
to improve the statistical profiling in the conventional crypt-
analysis (e.g., as in [7], [8]). These solutions are still based
on traditional cryptanalysis, e.g., requiring the knowledge of
cipher algorithms. Our neural cryptanalysis has completely
different attack goals and methodology.
Fig. 1: Car keys with Hitag2 transponders shown in [11]
Our contributions are summarized as follows.
• We present a new methodology to evaluate the strength
of cipher primitives with neural networks. Compared
with traditional cryptanalysis, it does not rely on the
knowledge of cipher algorithms. We define the difficulty
of mimicking a cipher by three metrics, cipher match
rate, training data, and time complexity, to measure the
strength of a cipher.
• We show the effectiveness of neural cryptanalysis on
round-reduced DES and proprietary cipher Hitag2. The
experiments show that the strength of Hitag2 is weaker
than the 3-round DES in neural cryptanalysis. We discuss
the network architecture by applying three different net-
works. Experiments show that the most powerful attack
neural network varies from cipher to cipher. While a fat-
and-shallow shaped fully connected network is the best
to attack the round-reduced DES, a deep-and thin shaped
fully connected network works best on Hitag2.
• We compare three common activation functions (e.g.
sigmoid, relu, tanh) in neural cryptanalysis. Experiments
show that Sigmoid converges more quickly than the other
two activation functions, which means it can reach certain
accuracy with the minimum training time. There is no
substantial difference in the converged cipher match rate.
We explore the impact of the training data volume on the
converged cipher match rate. It shows that more training
data significantly improves the converged cipher match
rate. With 216 Hitag2 training pairs, the neural network
achieves a cipher match rate of around 66%. When
training with 220 pairs, the cipher match rate reaches
98%.
Neural cryptanalysis enables the automatic black-box eval-
uation of cipher strengths. This evaluation methodology ap-
pears quite powerful and exciting, potentially applicable to all
ciphers, enabling researchers to compare cipher strengths in a
unified framework.
II. BACKGROUND AND CIPHER MIMICKING
Conventional cryptanalysis heavily relies on unbalanced
statistical properties. According to the different ways to find
the unbalanced properties, cryptanalysis is categorized into
different approaches. Differential cryptanalysis is one of the
most common approaches among them. We use it as the
representative to introduce conventional cryptanalysis.
Definition 1 (Difference). The difference ∆ of two equivalent
length bit streams P1 and P2 is defined as ∆ = P1 ⊕ P2 .
Definition 2 (Differential Path). When two plaintexts are
encrypted by a multi-round cipher, a k-round differential path
∆i → ∆i+k is a path where their difference is ∆i at the i-th
round and ∆i+k at the (i+ k)-th round, respectively.
Definition 3 (Probability of Differential Path ∆i → ∆i+k).
Given a fixed path, its probability is the fraction of plaintext
pairs that have the difference ∆i+k at the (i + k)-th round
among all the pairs having difference ∆i at the i-th round.
A conventional differential cryptanalysis approach (e.g., [1],
[5]) works as follows.
1) ATTACK PATH CONSTRUCTION PHASE: There are two
steps: the p rounds and the q rounds. The attacker’s
goal is to construct a p-round differential path with a
sufficiently high probability. Given an attacker-chosen
plaintext difference ∆0, each possible value of the
difference ∆p at the p-th round should occur with the
approximately equivalent probability of 2−n in a perfect
information-theoretically secure cipher, where n is the
length of the plaintext-ciphertext.
In reality, when there is a path with a much higher
probability than 2−n, an attacker may leverage it to infer
the subkey involved in the last q rounds. q is usually a
small value.
2) SUBKEY EXTRACTION PHASE: The attacker is assumed
to know many plaintext pairs satisfying the above ∆0
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and their corresponding ciphertext pairs. The high prob-
ability of differential path ∆0 → ∆p guarantees that
there are much more pairs having the given difference
∆p at the p-th round than an arbitrary value. All of these
ciphertext pairs are partially decrypted to the p-th round
by a guessed subkey in the last q round.
• If the guessed subkey is correct, then the calculated
differences at p-th round would match ∆p with the
expected high probability.
• If the guessed subkey is wrong, then the partial
decryption is meaningless. The attacker picks a new
guess and repeats.
3) EXHAUSTIVE SEARCH PHASE: With the known subkey
bits identified in the above phase, the attacker aims to
extract all the unknown key bits by trying all the pos-
sible key combinations, a partial brute-force approach.
The attack complexity required to crack the secret key
represents the strength indicator.
Differential cryptanalysis relies on the identified multi-
round high-probability differential paths. The entire path space
is too large to search exhaustively. Thus, human’s intuition and
experiences are important.
Mimicking ciphers by neural networks. In neural crypt-
analysis, we assess the strength of a cipher by measuring how
easy it is for a neural network to mimic the cipher. Intuitively,
an attacker should not compute ciphertexts from plaintexts, or
vice versa. Thus, a neural network (without the key) should not
be able to compute ciphertexts, either. The cipher’s strength is
reflected by how well an entity (a neural network) mimics the
cipher’s operations. We test whether or not a neural network
trained on plaintext-ciphertext pairs can output the correct
ciphertexts on new plaintexts. Intuitively, in our model the
easier a cipher algorithm can be mimicked by a well trained
neural network, the less secure this cipher is.
Choice of neural network architectures. Different net-
work architectures have different advantages. Long short-term
memory (LSTM) is good at predicting sequence dependency
relationships while convolutional neural network (CNN) is
good at extracting features within a small local area. Neither
of them fits the cipher algorithm case, as symmetric ciphers
usually apply substitutions and permutations among bits. Fully
connectivity is able to represent these relationships between
bits. Thus, we choose fully connected neural networks.
Ideally, the relationship between the ciphertext and plaintext
should achieve: 1) each bit in the plaintext can have influences
on all of the bits in the ciphertext and vice versa; 2) ciphertext
is designed to be close to a randomly generated binary stream.
Therefore, we decide to choose the multi-layer fully connected
neural network as the architecture and the softmax classifier
for each bit of the ciphertext stream. The full connection
ensures that each bit in the plaintext stream can have an impact
on every bit in the ciphertext.
Besides the regular fully connected neural network, we also
evaluate cascade fully connected neural networks mentioned in
[9]. The ordinary one only fully connects adjacent layers. The
cascade network includes the extra full connection between
interval layers. We compare this cascade architecture with the
ordinary fully connected architecture.
The ability of neural networks also varies from their scale
and shape. Intuitively, a larger neural network with more
parameters has a more powerful mimic capability. Is a fat but
shallow neural network better or a deep but thin neural network
better for the cipher mimic task? To answer this question,
we also perform experiments with two neural network models
under opposite shape settings.
Choice of metrics. Given a n-bit ciphertext, we count the
correct prediction for every single bit independently instead of
the entire ciphertext. Therefore, we count the bitwise cipher
match rate as the neural network’s prediction accuracy.
The converged training time and required minimum training
dataset are also important indicators of the mimic difficulty.
According to our measurement, this training complexity varies
from different neural network architectures. However, there is
no single neural network architecture that always outperforms
others across all objectives. Therefore, we decide to quantify
the cipher strength as its optimal attack complexity ever
achieved.
Best-effort strength evaluation For each cipher, we apply
multiple neural networks in a network suite to mimic it. The
best-effort mimicking metrics (i.e. highest accuracy and lowest
complexity) are identified as its strength. Similar to traditional
case, the strength is a relative notion to the attacking capability
– the neural network suite. We can never conclude a cipher
is absolute strong since more powerful attack may appear
in the future. Similar limitations also exist for conventional
cryptanalysis. The neural network suite indicates the current
attacking capability.
III. DEFINITIONS, METRICS, AND COMPUTATION
Symmetric encryption is generally described as the relation-
ship C = E(P, k), where C denotes the ciphertext space, P
denotes the plaintext space, k is the secret key, and E(·) is
the encryption algorithm. Traditional cryptanalysis evaluates
ciphers by attack complexity for cracking the key k with the
knowledge of P , C and E(·).
In neural cryptanalysis, we assume that E(·) is unknown.
Therefore, we transfer the goal as mimicking the operation
E(·, k), instead of cracking key k. The difficulty of mim-
icking algorithm E(·, k) is our security indicator. We choose
to represent E(·, k) as a trainable neural network. Like an
encryption algorithm, this neural network takes plaintexts as
input and outputs ciphertexts, without the knowledge of key
k. Intuitively, stronger ciphers are more difficult for neural
networks to mimic. We formalize neural cryptanalysis as a
4-element tuple (M1,M2, N, S) in Definition 4.
Definition 4 (Neural-cryptanalysis System). A neural crypt-
analysis system can be described as a tuple (M1,M2, N, S),
where M1 and M2 are two mutual exclusive finite sets of
plaintext-ciphertext pairs (p, c) that satisfy c = E(p, k),
p ∈ Zm2 , and c ∈ Z
n
2 . Z2 denotes the binary value space
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{0, 1} and Zt2 represents a binary stream of length t. N is a
set of neural networks trained by M1 and tested by M2. S
is the strength indicator generated by training and testing the
neural networks in N .
Our cryptanalysis consists of three operations, CIPHER
DATA COLLECTION, MIMIC MODEL TRAINING, and SECU-
RITY INDICATOR GENERATION. We briefly describe the first
two operations, as they are straightforward. We present the
CIPHER STRENGTH QUANTIFICATION operation in more de-
tails.
CIPHER DATA COLLECTION collects required plaintext-
ciphertext pairs to train and test the neural networks using the
black-box cipher. We collect two sets of plaintext/ciphertext
pairs, M1 for training and M2 for testing.
MIMIC MODEL TRAINING trains multiple neural networks
to mimic the target cipher and to identify the one with the
best performance. We train a neural network suite N . Each
candidate neural network is trained with pairs M1. The neural
network suite is the key to the maximum attack capability.
We include three multi-binary classifier neural networks in
the neural network suite in this work. The details are shown
in Fig. 2. Each cipher bit is predicted by a softmax binary
classifier. The entire n-bit ciphertext is predicted by n softmax
classifier, separately. These three networks differ from the
connection and shape. Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b are two fully
connected neural networks. Fig. 2a is a deep and thin network
with 4 thin hidden layers. Each layer has 128 neurons. Fig. 2b
is a fat and shallow network with 1 fat hidden layer which has
1000 neurons. Fig. 2c is a network with cascade connection.
Besides the full connection between every two adjacent layers,
every two interval layers are also fully connected. We select
one successful size setting from [10]. It has four hidden layers
with the size 128, 256, 256, 128 neurons, respectively.
SECURITY INDICATOR GENERATION computes a security
strength metric S composed of mimicking accuracy and
complexity. We gradually increase the training data until the
mimicking accuracy cannot be further improved. The maxi-
mum mimicking accuracy with its minimally required training
complexity is used as the final cipher security indicator.
If one cipher holds a higher prediction accuracy while the
other cipher holds a lower training complexity, our analysis
prioritizes the accuracy metric.
The final security indicator S is composed of three ele-
ments (Cmr,Compdata, Comptime), where Cmr is the ci-
pher match rate (Definition 5), Compdata is the minimum
required training data, and Comptime is the converged training
time. The last two elements represent the attack complexity.
Cipher match rate representing the mimicking accuracy is
defined next.
Definition 5 (Cipher Match Rate). Cipher match rate Cmr ∈
[0, 1] is the bitwise accuracy for the ciphertext prediction
of a neural network in neural cryptanalysis. When m n-bit
ciphertexts are generated by the neural network,
Cmr =
∑m
i=0
∑
j∈[0,n−1],cij=c′ij
1
m× n
where cij and c
′
ij denote the correct and predicted j-th bit of
i-th ciphertext, respectively.
We represent the entire evaluation process of neural crypt-
analysis in Algorithm 1
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode for neural cryptanalysis evalu-
ation. Each plaintext is a m-bit binary stream.
Result: S = (Cmr,Compdata, Comptime)
Initialization: Set Hyperparameter m1,m2, Cmrbase
(2m1 is the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs in M1;
2m2 is the number of pairs in M2; Cmrbase is the base
match rate.);
Cmr = 0, Cmrimprove = 0, Compdata = m1 − 1;
Generating M2: Randomly select 2
m2 plaintexts and
obtain corresponding ciphertexts;
while (Cmr 6 Cmrbase or Cmrimprove > 0) and
Compdata < m−m2 do
Compdata = Compdata + 1;
Cmrimprove = 0;
Generating M1 Randomly select 2
compdata
plaintexts p ∈ Zm2 and p /∈M2, obtain
corresponding ciphertexts.;
for each neural network model ni ∈ N do
Train ni to converge with iter iterations;
Comptime = iter;
Cmrni = test bitwise accuracy with M2;
if Cmrni > Cmr then
Cmrimprove+ = Cmrni − Cmr;
Cmr = Cmrni ;
else
end
end
end
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We apply neural cryptanalysis on the round-reduced DES
and a real-world widely deployed CPS cipher Hitag2. We also
systematically evaluate how various neural network parameters
impact the cryptanalysis outcomes and compare the security
strengths of Hitag2 and round-reduced DES.
Experimental setup. Because the full-round DES algorithm
is complex, it is common to first analyze a round-reduced
version [1]. Due to its symmetry, there is no difference
between predicting ciphertexts from plaintexts and prediting
plaintexts from ciphertexts. Hitag2 is a stream cipher which
generates one secret bit at a time based on a 48 bits state
value in a linear-feedback shift register (LFSR). Hitag2 has
been reverse engineered in [12].
Our experiments aim to answer the following questions.
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Fig. 2: Three different neural network architecture applied in experiments
1) How well do the three neural networks mimic cipher
algorithms?
2) How do the various factors (e.g. network shapes, con-
nections, activation functions, and training data volume)
impact the mimicking capabilities?
3) How strong is the cipher Hitag2 compared with a round-
reduced DES?
The three neural networks are implemented with Tensor-
flow. We use the sigmoid activation function as the default
choice except for the comparative experiments on activation
functions. We choose the softmax classifier and the cross-
entropy loss function for backward propagation optimization.
The maximum training epoch is set to 350. The batch size
is 1000. We use a personal laptop to run the training tasks.
We compare the attack capability between the three different
neural networks: i) a fat and shallow neural network, ii) a thin
and deep neural network, and iii) a cascade neural network
from [9].
A. Impact of Different Networks on DES
To decide whether the attack succeeds, we use a base match
rate as the baseline accuracy. In our experiment, when and
only when the cipher match rate is higher than the base match
rate, the attack is regarded as successful.
Base Match Rate of 1-round DES The base match rate
for most ciphers is 50%, which can be achieved by random
guess statistically. However, we set the base match rate as
75% for 1-round DES. The reason for which is explained
next. DES algorithm follows the Feistel structure. In such a
structure, cipher bits are separated into two equivalent length
parts. In each round, only one part (half block) is updated
by the cryptographic round function. The other half is only
permuted by bit shifting. Therefore, we assume the half block
bits updated by the cryptographic functions is hard to guess
while the other half is easy to guess. In that case, the base
match rate for the difficult half is still 50%, however, the base
match rate for the simple shifting half is 100%. Therefore, for
the entire 64 ciphertext bits, the base match rate is 75%.
We implement the round-reduced DES and collect two 217
plaintext/ciphertext pairs. Half of them are used to train the
three neural networks. The other half is used to test the well-
trained model. As shown in Fig. 3, the fat and shallow network
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Fig. 3: Predicted Accuracy on 1-round DES
achieves the highest accuracy. It almost perfectly predicts the
ciphertext bits with the cipher match rate of 99.7%. The other
two neural networks only achieve 75% cipher match rate,
which is no better than the base match rate for one-round DES.
It means that the two networks are not better than random
guessing for the right 32 bits cryptographic function output.
Therefore, we conclude that when the attack object is DES-
like algorithms, the fat and shallow shaped network is the best
choice among the three neural networks.
B. Impact of Different Activation Functions on DES
Activation functions are the only non-linear components
of the neural networks. There are three common activation
functions sigmoid, tanh and relu. We conduct comparative
experiments on the three activation functions. We use the
fat and shallow network in the comparative experiments for
activation functions. The result is shown in Fig. 4. They reach
similar cipher match rates. However, sigmoid function learns
much faster than tanh and relu functions.
C. DES Measurement Results
Based on the former experiments, we identify the fat and
shallow network with sigmoid activation as the optimal choice
among these settings for DES. We test higher rounds DES
to observe the mimicking capability of this neural network.
The mimic results for 1-round, 2-round and 3-round DES are
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Fig. 4: Influence of Activation Functions
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Fig. 5: Attack capacity summary for round-reduced DES
shown in Fig. 5. (Only 1-round DES holds the base match
rate as 75%. 2-round and 3-round DES have the base match
rate of 50%.) The fat and shallow neural network successfully
attacked 1-round DES and 2-round DES, with the cipher match
rate higher than their base match rate. However, this network
cannot mimic 3-round DES successfully. The cipher match rate
stays at 50%. Therefore, this model cannot evaluate ciphers
stronger than 3-round DES. The reason is likely the simplicity
of the network used in these experiments. To evaluate more
complex cipher algorithms, more sophisticated architecture
or larger scale neural networks with more parameters are
required. We leave it as future work.
D. Hitag2 Measurement Results
Besides the round-reduced DES, we also conduct exper-
iments on Hitag2, which is a widely deployed stream ci-
pher used in modern car key systems. Stream ciphers differ
from block ciphers. Block ciphers (e.g. DES) encrypt n bits
plaintext into n bits ciphertext with a key. Stream ciphers
consistently output an unlimited secret stream bit by bit.
The single output bit is calculated based on an m-bit binary
stream held in an LFSR. Then, the state of the LFSR is
automatically updated and another secret bit is output based
on the updated binary stream in the LFSR. We regard the
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Fig. 6: The predicted accuracy of Hitag2 on two models
block cipher algorithm as a n bits to n bits mapping and the
stream cipher algorithm as m bits to 1 bit mapping. Neural
cryptanalysis treats the 2 cipher mimicking tasks the same.
Hitag2 only outputs 1 bit at a time. Our neural networks only
have 1 softmax binary classifier rather than 64 classifiers as
in the DES cases.
We implemented Hitag2 and collected 217 input/output
pairs. 216 pairs are used as training data and 216 pairs are
used in the evaluation. We apply the fat and shallow network,
deep and thin network to mimic Hitag2 cipher. The cascade
connection architecture is discarded because it does not show
any advantage over the ordinary full connectivity architecture
in the DES experiments.
Figure 6 displays the increasing cipher match rate along the
training epochs for Hitag2. With the cipher match rates being
higher than 50%, both the two networks mimic the Hitag2
successfully. The deep and thin network outperforms the fat
and shallow one. However, this result is contrary to DES cases
in Section IV-A. The fat and shallow network shows more
power to attack round-reduced DES than the deep and thin
network. This observation suggests that there is no single one
optimal choice for all ciphers.
E. Impact of Training Data Size
We measure whether or not a larger training data set can
substantially improve the converged cipher match rate.
In Section IV-D, with 216 pairs training data, the maximum
cipher match rate of the fat and shallow neural network is
around 66%. We increase the available training data to 220
pairs and test the converged model on the same test set. Fig. 7
shows that when training set increases to 220 from 216, the
cipher match rate rises to around 98% from 66%.
To compare the cipher strengths between two cipher primi-
tives, we maximize their cipher match rates by increasing the
training data. The maximum cipher match rate with its data
and time complexity are used for the comparison.
F. Security Comparison w.r.t. Round-reduced DES
We compare the security level of Hitag2 with respect to var-
ious round-reduced DES algorithms. As visualized in Fig. 8,
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Fig. 7: Influence on predicted accuracy by training size
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Fig. 8: Comparison of Hitag2 and Round-reduced DES. The
left y-axis shows the cipher match rate. The right y-axis shows
the minimum training data and time complexity required
to achieve such a cipher match rate. The data and time
complexity is shown in log scale.
the optimal attack result for 1-round DES is (99.7%, 216, 219).
The optimal attack result for Hitag2 is (98%, 220, 222). The 3-
round DES is not attacked successfully with the 220 training
data and 230 iterations. Therefore the strength of Hitag2 is
located between the 1-round DES and 3-round DES, indicating
very weak security.
Summary of findings. From these experiments, we observe that
the following findings.
• Fully connected neural networks successfully mimic the
1,2-round DES and Hitag2.
• For different ciphers, the most powerful mimicking neural
networks may be different. This result indicates that one
needs to try different neural networks when evaluating a
new unknown cipher.
• The network with Sigmoid activation function learns
faster than Tanh and Relu. However, there is no substan-
tial difference in their converged cipher match rates.
• More training pairs significantly increase the converged
cipher match rate as expected.
V. DISCUSSION
We train neural networks to predict ciphertexts from plain-
texts. One can use the approach to predict plaintexts from
ciphertexts. It is equivalent to mimic the reverse function of a
cipher algorithm.
CHOICE OF BASE MATCH RATE The base match rate is
a manually defined baseline of cipher match rate. When
the network fails to learn any useful information from the
plaintext-ciphertext pairs, the cipher match rate is always
around 50% for a large test set. A higher cipher match rate
indicates that useful information to predict the cipher bits is
learned from the plaintext-ciphertext pairs. In the one-round
DES case, half cipher bits are updated by the cryptographic
function while the other half cipher bits are shifted from the
plaintext bits. Thus, we set the base match rate of 1-round
DES to be 75%, instead of 50%.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK Although successfully
mimicking Hitag2, the neural networks we use are simple.
These simple neural networks can only evaluate ciphers
weaker than 3-round DES. To evaluate more complex or
non-deprecated ciphers in the Federal Information Processing
Standard (FIPS) Publication 140-2, more powerful neural
networks are required. We plan to improve the attack capability
in the future work. It involves the following open problems.
HOW TO DESIGN THE NEURAL NETWORK TO FIT CIPHER
MIMICKING TASKS? Cipher algorithms are composed of it-
erated arithmetical and logical operations, which are not in
the traditional scope of neural networks. Current neural net-
work architectures are not designed for cipher relations. Fully
connected architecture, although capable of mimicking the
complicated dependency between ciphertext bits and plaintext
bits, might not be the most efficient architecture. Customizing
neural networks with fewer parameters to mimic the cipher
function is interesting future work.
HOW TO TRAIN THE NEURAL NETWORK EFFECTIVELY
AND EFFICIENTLY? Symmetric ciphers are complex func-
tions. To mimic them, the neural network must include many
parameters. However, networks with too many parameters, are
difficult to train. Understanding the impact of loss functions
and optimization algorithms is important. Which is the best
choice combination for cipher mimic tasks? Can we customize
the loss function and optimization algorithm for this specific
task? These questions need to be answered by future work.
VI. RELATED WORK
The related work can be summarized into two categories,
cryptanalysis solutions and neural networks for cryptanalysis
research.
A. Cryptanalysis for Symmetric Ciphers
The specific approaches to evaluate cipher strengths vary
dramatically case by case. The representative methods include
differential cryptanalysis [5], linear cryptanalysis [2] and their
variants. The differential approach attacks DES with 237
encryptions and the linear approach attacks DES with 247
known-plaintexts complexity, respectively.
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In cyber-physical systems, the evaluation can only be done
with the help of reverse engineering [13]. Many real-world
CPS ciphers have been shown broken. The widespread DST40
cipher which is often used in immobilizer transponders was
reverse-engineered and found broken [14]. Another widely
used CPS cipher, Hitag2, was also cracked after reverse-
engineering [11], [15], [16]. CPS cipher Megamos Crypto
was found to be vulnerable after reverse-engineering and
cryptanalysis [17], [18]. The analysis found that there is a
flawed key generation which can reduce the exhaustive search
complexity from 296 to 257. Those flaws in CPS ciphers have
affected many real-world systems [16].
B. Neural Networks in Cryptanalysis
The applications of deep learning in cryptanalysis are
limited. One major direction is to the learning-aided side
channel attacks. [8], [19]–[21]. Researchers apply learning
approaches to replace the traditional statistical profiling phase
in side-channel attacks. This approach differs greatly from
our approach. The deep learning approach only acts as one
component of the entire side-channel attack. Therefore, the
analysis still requires the cipher algorithm.
There are also a few applications in traditional cryptanalysis
which do not rely on side-channel information. [22] lever-
ages neural networks to classify ciphertexts generated from
different cipher algorithms. They successfully distinguish the
ciphertexts of Enhanced RC6 and SEAL. [7] uses neural
networks to determine the correct key in the key recovery
attack of traditional cryptanalysis. Their attack is successful
on the 2-round and 3-round HypCipher. However, similar to
the learning-aided side-channel attacks, it does not change the
white-box algorithm assumption which the traditional attack
relies on.
The work most relevant to ours is [9], [10]. The work treats
DES as a black-box. A cascade neural network structure is
applied to directly take the plaintexts as input and trained to
output corresponding ciphertexts. The author claimed to have
successfully attacked DES and 3-DES. However, the results
are not reproducible by us. In addition, the parameters of
their networks are too few to approximate the full DES and
3-DES. Our work presents a universal metric to enable the
direct comparison between ciphers, which is new. Applying
neural cryptanalysis to CPS ciphers is also new.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a new approach to evaluate the
strength of symmetric ciphers in a black-box fashion without
knowing the specific algorithm. We defined quantitative met-
rics to capture a cipher’s strength. These metrics are calculated
from the difficulty to attack the cipher via neural networks.
Using Hitag2 and round-reduced DES algorithms, we ex-
perimentally demonstrated that our metric and methodology
are practical and useful to quantify cipher strengths and allow
one to directly compare between ciphers. We showed how
various factors associated with the neural networks can impact
the analysis outcomes. This new neural cryptanalysis approach
has the potential to automate the security evaluation for cipher
systems.
REFERENCES
[1] E. Biham and A. Shamir, “Differential cryptanalysis of DES-like cryp-
tosystems,” Journal of CRYPTOLOGY, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 3–72, 1991.
[2] M. Matsui, “Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher,” in Workshop
on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques. Springer,
1993, pp. 386–397.
[3] R. C.-W. Phan, “Impossible differential cryptanalysis of 7-round ad-
vanced encryption standard (AES),” Information processing letters,
vol. 91, no. 1, pp. 33–38, 2004.
[4] A. Biryukov and D. Khovratovich, “Related-key cryptanalysis of the full
AES-192 and AES-256,” in International Conference on the Theory and
Application of Cryptology and Information Security. Springer, 2009,
pp. 1–18.
[5] E. Biham and A. Shamir, “Differential cryptanalysis of the full 16-round
DES,” in Annual International Cryptology Conference. Springer, 1992,
pp. 487–496.
[6] S. EM-Microelectronic-Marin, “125khz crypto read/write contactless
identification device,” EM, vol. 4170, pp. 1–13.
[7] A. M. Albassal and A.-M. Wahdan, “Neural network based cryptanalysis
of a Feistel type block cipher,” in International Conference on Electrical,
Electronic and Computer Engineering, 2004. ICEEC’04. IEEE, 2004,
pp. 231–237.
[8] Z. Martinasek, P. Dzurenda, and L. Malina, “Profiling power analysis
attack based on MLP in DPA contest v4. 2,” in 2016 39th International
Conference on Telecommunications and Signal Processing (TSP). IEEE,
2016, pp. 223–226.
[9] M. M. Alani, “Neuro-cryptanalysis of DES and triple-DES,” in Interna-
tional Conference on Neural Information Processing. Springer, 2012,
pp. 637–646.
[10] ——, “Neuro-cryptanalysis of DES,” in World Congress on Internet
Security (WorldCIS-2012). IEEE, 2012, pp. 23–27.
[11] R. Verdult, F. D. Garcia, and J. Balasch, “Gone in 360 seconds:
Hijacking with Hitag2,” in Presented as part of the 21st USENIX
Security Symposium USENIX Security 12), 2012, pp. 237–252.
[12] I. Wiener, “Hitag2 pcf7936/46/47/52 stream cipher reference implemen-
tation,” August 2007.
[13] K. Nohl, D. Evans, S. Starbug, and H. Plo¨tz, “Reverse-engineering a
cryptographic RFID tag.” in USENIX security symposium, vol. 28, 2008.
[14] S. Bono, M. Green, A. Stubblefield, A. Juels, A. D. Rubin, and
M. Szydlo, “Security analysis of a cryptographically-enabled RFID
device.” in USENIX Security Symposium, vol. 31, 2005, pp. 1–16.
[15] A. Tekian, “Doctoral programs in health professions education,” Medical
teacher, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 73–81, 2014.
[16] F. D. Garcia, D. Oswald, T. Kasper, and P. Pavlide`s, “Lock it and still
lose it on the (in) security of automotive remote keyless entry systems,”
in 25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 16), 2016.
[17] R. Verdult, F. D. Garcia, and B. Ege, “Dismantling Megamos crypto:
Wirelessly lockpicking a vehicle immobilizer,” in Supplement to the
Proceedings of 22nd USENIX Security Symposium (Supplement to
USENIX Security 15), 2015, pp. 703–718.
[18] R. Verdult and F. D. Garcia, “Cryptanalysis of the Megamos crypto
automotive immobilizer,” USENIX; login, vol. 40, no. 6, pp. 17–22,
2015.
[19] G. Hospodar, B. Gierlichs, E. De Mulder, I. Verbauwhede, and J. Vande-
walle, “Machine learning in side-channel analysis: a first study,” Journal
of Cryptographic Engineering, vol. 1, no. 4, p. 293, 2011.
[20] L. Lerman, G. Bontempi, O. Markowitch et al., “Power analysis attack:
an approach based on machine learning.” IJACT, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 97–
115, 2014.
[21] E. Cagli, C. Dumas, and E. Prouff, “Convolutional neural networks
with data augmentation against jitter-based countermeasures,” in Interna-
tional Conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems.
Springer, 2017, pp. 45–68.
[22] B. Chandra and P. P. Varghese, “Applications of cascade correlation
neural networks for cipher system identification,” World Academy of
Science, Engineering and Technology, vol. 26, pp. 312–314, 2007.
The 2019 IEEE Conference on Dependable and Secure Computing 8
